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Bester 1985 Boot Thakor and Udell 1991  
Boot and Thakor 1994 Berger Frame and Ioannidou 2011  
Stiglitz and Weiss 1981

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2001

2003

2016/2

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Brick Palia

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Hernández-Cánovas Martínez-Solano

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Brick Palia 2007

$$\text{Probit(collat)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Prem} + \beta_2 \text{Guanxi} + \beta_3 \text{Amount} + \beta_4 \text{Maturity} + \beta_5 \text{Asset} + \beta_6 \text{Lev} + \beta_7 \text{Cr} + \beta_8 \text{HHI} + \beta_9 \text{History} \\ + \beta_{10} \text{Inter} + \beta_{11} \text{Credit}$$

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4 T

		T			T			T			
>=4	.485	3.715	>=1	.444	1.187	>= 2	.449	1.548	>= 1.58	.667	3.413
<4	.337	***	<1	.396		<2	.385		< 1.580	.408	***
>= 4	3.216	-0.619	>=1	3.164	-1.717	>= 2	3.211	-0.798	>= 1.58	2.496	-3.268
<4	3.297		<1	3.392	*	<2	3.319		< 1.58	3.307	**

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Person

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	1	2	3	4	5
	3.46***	4.25***	4.10***	3.97***	0.821***
	0.49***				.127***
		0.09			.040
			0.14		-.020
				0.70***	.091***
	-0.12**	-0.12**	-0.11**	-0.14***	-.204***
	0.40	0.28	0.27	0.18	-.028
	-0.11*	-0.13**	-0.13**	-0.15**	-.119***
					-.057
					.160**
					.106***
					.059
					.183**
					-.215*
					*
Adj-R <sup>2</sup>	0.37	0.35	0.35	0.49	0.55
F	4.23***	4.13***	4.44***	5.01***	7.92***
	629	629	629	629	629

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Degryse Van Cayseele Machauer

Weber Rajan Winton

Menkhoff 2006

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Berger Udell

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Ongena Smith

Elsas Krahn

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		6	7	8	9	10	11
		7.19***	7.21***	7.39***	6.84***	6.881***	5.387***
		-1.48***	-1.47***	-1.47***	-1.50***	-.440***	-.915***
		0.01	0.01			.033	.268**
				-0.15		.020	.111
					0.58***	-.030	-.164
		-0.39***	-0.39***	-0.39***	-0.40***	.113***	.605***
		-0.71	-0.71	-0.72	-0.76*	-.122*	-.159**
		-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.06	-.079*	-.806*
						-.075*	-.089*
						.053	.221
						.084**	.534***
						-.254***	-.322***
						-.054	-.136
						-.086	-.024
	*					.035	.004
	*						-.317*
	Adj-R <sup>2</sup>	0.42	0.42	0.41	0.50	0.55	0.56
2011	F	5.98***	5.90***	5.92***	6.00***	8.41***	8.55***
		629	629	629	629	629	629

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Lehmann Neuberger Rathke

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6 11

0.317 10%

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