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[1] Harold Noonan *Personal Identity*, London: Routledge, 2003, p.21; Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, p.271; Sydney Shoemaker, "Personal Identity: A Materialist's Account", in Shoemaker and Swinburne ed., *Personal Identity*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1984, p.99

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[3][4]Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1984, p.210 p.262

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[1] Gary Fuller, “Functionalism and Personal Identity”, *The Personalist Forum*, Vol.8, No.1, Supplement: Studies in Personalist Philosophy, Proceedings of the Conference on Persons Spring 1992, pp.133- 143; Nicholas Agar, “Functionalism and Personal Identity”, *Nous*, 2003 37, pp.52- 70